NTIA, FirstNet Governance, and the Risk to Public Safety Independence

The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency within the Department of Commerce, appears to be pursuing a coup to take control over the FirstNet Authority. I have been informed that draft legislative language has been circulating that would materially alter FirstNet’s governance structure. Notably, credible reporters have contacted individuals for comment on legislation that those individuals had not seen—suggesting that information has been selectively shared outside stakeholder channels.

If accurate, this represents an unacceptable attempt to undermine the independent governance structure that public safety specifically requested and Congress intentionally created for FirstNet.

What is most troubling is not merely the substance of this effort, but what it suggests about NTIA’s posture toward FirstNet: namely, that NTIA has not been a consistently honest or transparent partner in supporting the program. This concern is amplified by past Inspector General reports that, in my view, misguidedly places blame on the FirstNet Authority Board for matters that NTIA has exercised authority over.

Example: CEO Supervision

One Inspector General report criticized the FirstNet Board for allegedly failing to supervise the FirstNet CEO. However, as former FirstNet Board Chairs can attest—and as federal personnel law makes clear—federal employees must be supervised by other federal employees. NTIA hires the FirstNet CEO, conducts performance evaluations, and exercises direct supervisory authority. If there was a supervisory failure, it was NTIA’s failure. Assigning blame to the Board creates the appearance of scapegoating rather than accountability.

Why FirstNet Was Made Independent

Between 2010 and 2012, public safety stakeholders fought explicitly for an independent authority. The reason was simple: to prevent federal fund diversion, mission drift, and bureaucratic interference—and to ensure that the network remained focused on state and local public safety needs. Congress agreed and codified this independence in statute.

Congress placed FirstNet administratively within NTIA largely because of NTIA’s spectrum expertise and its role in managing auction proceeds that provided FirstNet’s initial funding. This placement was never intended to grant NTIA programmatic or operational control over the network. 

NTIA, candidly, has little understanding of first responder operational requirements. That gap was to be filled by the FirstNet Board.

PSIC: A Warning Ignored

Before FirstNet, NTIA administered the Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) Grant Program, nearly $1 billion in federal funding. That program failed to achieve nationwide interoperability. I had administrative oversight of Nevada’s PSIC program, who dealt directly with NTIA, for a limited time prior to my retirement. Subsequently, I learned that states were not held accountable for compliance, waivers were routinely granted to spend funds outside grant guidance, and the program produced little lasting help to first responders.

This failure was not theoretical. GAO and other federal reviews have documented that over $13 billion was spent on interoperability efforts between 2001 and 2010 with limited success as noted in a Congressional Research Service analysis by Linda K. Moore in June of 2011. In my opinion, PSIC was a central part of that failure.

A Pattern, Not an Isolated Incident

When reviewing Inspector General and GAO audits across NTIA technology programs supporting state and local governments, a consistent pattern emerges showing weak oversight, poor accountability, and outcomes that fail to meet operational needs.

The criticisms now levied against FirstNet echo those same institutional shortcomings. Former FirstNet Board Chairs can cite additional examples, including NTIA’s prolonged failure to release funds for new site builds—funds that continue to sit idle. Having several FirstNet Chairs testify together in front of congress would be a stunning eye opener.

The Cultural Disconnect

We also face resistance from federal employees and congressional staff who believe they understand public safety communications because they use commercial networks and exchange data. They do not. Public safety communications are not consumer broadband. They involve priority and preemption, hardened security, coverage in extreme conditions, device management, identity control, and mission-critical reliability. These requirements are operational realities—not policy abstractions.

This is precisely why Congress required an independent FirstNet Authority Board dominated by public safety expertise.

NTIA’s Proper Federal Role

NTIA does have an appropriate role:

  • Fiscal management
  • Audits and compliance
  • Human resources support
  • Inspector General oversight
  • GAO reporting to Congress

We do not want duplicative federal bureaucracy. But network oversight and program management must remain with the FirstNet Authority Board, not NTIA.

Conclusion

NTIA has failed public safety—not just today, but historically. Billions have been spent with little to show for it. In contrast, FirstNet is a self-sustaining program, requiring no federal appropriations, with over 7 million connections, built by the selected contractor who won the competitive bid with oversight by the FirstNet Authority—not NTIA.

Improvements can and should be made. Congress has done so before and can do so again. But NTIA should be a partner—not a predator.

Congress should seriously consider whether this program belongs instead within the Department of Justice, an institution with operational familiarity with first responders and public safety missions.

Six Historical Examples

NTIA Program Failures and Oversight Findings

This report compiles documented failures, terminations, and oversight findings involving major

programs administered by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)

over the past decade. 

1. Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment

(BEAD) Program

In 2024–2025, the GAO issued a legal decision finding that NTIA failed to comply with the

Congressional Review Act (CRA) when it substantially revised BEAD program rules without submitting

them to Congress.

The CRA requires agencies to submit rules to Congress and the Comptroller General before they can

take effect.

GAO concluded that NTIA’s revised BEAD policies constituted a rule under the CRA and therefore

should have been submitted to Congress.

Source: GAO Decision Bn337604 – https://www.gao.gov/products/b-337604

Analysis: State broadband offices were directed to comply with rules that may have lacked legal force.

(Note this is one issue. The program is still a mess, and many states have not received their funding)

2. Middle Mile Broadband Infrastructure Program

Oversight bodies identified weaknesses in NTIA’s planning and accountability framework for the

Middle Mile Broadband Infrastructure Program.

GAO and OIG reports note the absence of clearly defined performance goals and outcome metrics

during early program implementation.

Without performance measures, NTIA cannot effectively determine whether the program is

achieving its statutory objectives.

Source: Department of Commerce OIG ––https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-14-023-A.pd

3. Digital Equity Act Competitive Grant Program

In May 2025, NTIA terminated the Digital Equity Competitive Grant Program after award notifications

had already been issued.

Counties and local entities were forced to halt planned digital inclusion projects.

Counties had begun implementation planning based on expected federal funding that was later

withdrawn.

Source: National Association of Counties –

https://www.naco.org/news/ntia-terminates-digital-equity-act-grants

4. NTIA Innovation Fund Program

The Department of Commerce OIG found that NTIA launched the Innovation Fund Program without

adequate strategic planning or risk management.

Staffing and governance frameworks were insufficient for the scope of the program.

OIG identified weaknesses in NTIA’s planning processes that could hinder program effectiveness.

Source: Commerce OIG Semiannual Report –

https://www.oig.doc.gov/wp-content/OIGPublications/OIG-25-031-I_FinalReport-SECURED.pdf

5. Systemic Oversight Issues Across NTIA

Broadband Programs

Commerce OIG semiannual reports cite recurring deficiencies in NTIA’s administration of broadband

grant programs.

Issues include delayed performance metrics, limited internal controls, and reliance on corrective

actions after program launch.

Rapid program expansion increased oversight risks that were not fully mitigated.

Source: Commerce OIG Broadband Oversight – https://www.oig.doc.gov/broadband/

6. Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP)

Oversight reviews of NTIA’s administration of the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP) identified significant weaknesses in program management, oversight, and outcome evaluation. The Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General (OIG) found deficiencies in NTIA’s monitoring of BTOP infrastructure projects, Separately, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed BTOP’s broadband adoption efforts and concluded that NTIA lacked clear outcome-based performance measures to determine whether program activities effectively addressed barriers to broadband adoption. Source (OIG): Department of Commerce OIG Final Audit Report No. OIG-14-023-A –https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-14-023-A.pdSource (GAO): GAO-15-473, Broadband: Intended Outcomes and Effectiveness of Efforts to Address Adoption Barriers Are Unclear –https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-15-473

By Kamala Kuhn

Retired Deputy Chief Nevada Division of Emergency Management

Director of Grants Assistance

Public Sector Grants

print

Be the first to comment on "NTIA, FirstNet Governance, and the Risk to Public Safety Independence"

Leave a comment

Your email address will not be published.


*